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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Respondents argue that testimony concerning an 
agreement establishing the boundary line in question 
was not admissible because of the "dead man" statute, 
and also that there had not been sufficient "acquies-
cence" by respondents to establish a boundary line. In 
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addition, the respondent, Carter, by cross appeal con-
tends that the trial court erred in refusing to award 
damages. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE "DEAD MAN" STATUTE HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
It is contended by Carter and Dover that the "dead ' 
man" statute, section 78-24-2 ( 3), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, effectually prevents the defendant, Lindner, 
from testifying as to the agreement with Robert Dover 
for the location of the boundary fence. 
The "dead man" statute has no application to this , 
case. It will be noted that by its express language it 
applies to civil actions " ... when the adverse party in 
such action, suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues, 
or def ends, as guardian of an insane or incompetent 
person, or as the EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRA-
TOR, HEIR, LEGATEE OR DEVISEE OF 
ANY DECEASED PERSON, or as guardian, assi-
gnee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, lega-
tee or devisee, as to any statement by, or transaction 
with, such deceased, insane or incompetent person, or 
matter of fact whatever ... " (emphasis added) 
The grantee mentioned in the statute must be a 
"grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or 
devisee". (emphasis added) . 
2 
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In the case of Anderson v. Johnson, 121Utah173, 
239 P.2d 1073, one Marie T. Johnson, a daughter of 
the deceased person, who def ended as a grantee under 
a deed recorded the day before her father died was not 
within the purview of the "dead man" statute and was 
a competent witness. The Supreme Court said: 
" ... In applying the provisions of the above 
statute, the court took the view that Marie T. 
Johnson, one of the respondents, was def ending 
as an heir. If Marie were defending as an heir, 
she would have been defending for the benefit of 
the estate of the deceased. However, this she 
clearly was not doing. She claimed that property 
as a grantee and not for the benefit of the es-
tate ... " 
See also Grieve v. Howard, 54 Utah 225, 242, 180 
P. 423, in which the court said: 
" ... As the defendant, Mark Howard, was 
not opposing or def ending as guardian, execu-
tor, administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of 
the deceased, or as guardian, assignee, or grantee 
of such heir, legatee or devisee, we cannot under-
stand how the testimony of appellant was pro-
hibited, even if it was concerning a fact equally 
within the knowledge of the witness and the 
deceased. A reasonably careful analysis of this 
statute will conclusively demonstrate that, in 
view of the relation and character of the parties, 
the matter was not within the statute. As we 
understand the situation, defendant was defend-
ing not as an heir of the deceased, but as a 
grantee under the deed executed by her. The re-
lation was not such as to entitle him to object 
3 
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to the testimony on the grounds that it was pro-
hibited by the statute. Miller v. Livingstone, 
31 Utah at page 435, 88 Pac. 338; 40 Cyc. 2270 
to 227 5, inclusive . . ." 
The testimony of Mr. Lindner as to the agreement 
for the location of the fence without survey was clearly 
admissible. In this case there was no heir, legatee or 
devisee involved. Mr. Carter's immediate predecessor 
did not acquire title as an heir but as a grantee under 
a Quit Claim Deed dated December 7, 1957, Exhibit 
P-2. In this suit no one sued or defended as a guardian 
or as executor, or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee 
of any deceased person as required by the statute. The 
agreement was immediately acted upon by the con-
struction by the defendants of a permanent fence which 1 
has marked the boundary since 1955. 
2. THE BOUNDARY LINE WAS ESTAB-
LISHED BY AGREEMENT AND PERFORM-
ANCE OF THAT AGREEMENT. 
The boundary line was established by agreement 
between Mr. Lindner and respondents' predecessor, 
Robert Dover, in 1955. The construction of a six-foot 
chain link fence with posts set in concrete in 1955 (R. 
17, 19) is evidence of the performance of the agreement. 
Respondent seems to suggest that the principle of ' 
boundary by agreement is the same as the principle 
of boundary by acquiescence except for the agreement 
and uncertainty at the time of agreement. (Respond-
ents' Brief, p. 7). 
4 
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Uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line is 
an element of both boundary by agreement, and bound-
ary by acquiescence as is pointed out in Brown v. Mil-
liner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2d 202, at page 207 and 
followed in Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 23, 239 P.2d 
205. It is also stated that where there is no uncertainty 
or dispute as to the true boundary neither oral agree-
ment nor acquiescence is sufficient to establish the 
boundary. 
The rule of boundary by acquiescence is further 
stated in Brown v. Milliner, supra: 
" ... We have further held in this state that 
in the absence of evidence that the owners of 
adjoining property or their predecessors in 
interest ever expressly agreed as to the location 
of the boundary between them, if they have 
occupied their respective premises up to an open 
boundary line visibly marked by monuments, 
fences or buildings for a long period of time 
and mutually recognized it is the dividing line 
between them, the law will imply an agreement 
fixing the boundary as located, if it can do so 
consistently with the facts appearing, and will 
not permit the parties nor their grantees to de-
part from such line . . . " 
Thus, where there is no express agreement the evi-
dence of acquiescence is used to imply the agreement. 
However: 
" . . . A review of the Utah cases involving 
boundary disputes reveals that it has long been 
recognized in this state that when the location 
5 
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of the true boundary between two adjoinig tracts 
of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the 
owners thereof may, by parol agreement, estab-
lish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably 
bind themselves and their grantees."-Brown Y. 
Milliner, supra. 
Under respondents' suggestion, there would be no 
difference between boundary by acquiescence and 
boundary by agreement except for an agreement. They 
would still require the same proof for both. This is 
not in agreement with the authorities which use acqui-
escence to imply the agreement where there was no 
agreement. 
In cases where the agreement relied upon for the 
boundary is oral, the agreement " . . . is not within the 
statute of frauqs when the true line is uncertain or in 
dispute, because such agreement is not regarded as 
passing title to land but 'determines the location of the 
existing estate of each, and, when followed by posses-
sion and occupancy, binds them, not by way of passing 
title, but as determining the true location of the bound- , 
ary line between their lands.' Berghoefer v. Frazier, , 
150 Ill. 577, 37 N.E. 914". Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 
57, 276 P. 912. 
See also Schleining v. White, 163 Colo. 484 431 
P.2d 458 (1967). 
The "acquiescence" which respondent suggests is 
necessary is really a showing of performance of the 
agreement by recognizing the boundary and thus mak-
ing the parol agreement enforceable. 
6 
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Mr. Lindner's erection of the fence and the occu-
pation and possession of the area up to the fence (R. 
64) shows performance of the agreement making it an 
executed agreement. Mr. Lindner also stated that he 
had received no complaint concerning the location of 
the fence until just before this suit was filed, some twelve 
years before the fence was completed ( R. 65) . There 
is no evidence of any objection, complaint or disagree-
ment with the location of the fence by Robert Dover 
from 1955 to his death. In addition, it should be noted 
that Frank Dover testified in 1957, two months before 
Robert Dover's death, that he, Frank Dover, com-: 
plained to Mr. Lindner about the location of the fence 
(R. 75). However, Robert Dover died in 1957 (R. 73) 
and the quit claim deed conveying the land in question 
to Frank Dover, Exhibit P-2 through which he claims 
an interest in this land was not executed until Decem-
ber 7, 1957 and it was not recorded until January 7, 
1958. If Frank Dover talked to Mr. Lindner about 
the fence as he testified, two months before Robert 
Dover's death, it would have had to have been some 
time before Frank Dover had acquired any interest in 
the land and thus could not be taken as an objection 
by any party in interest as to the location of the bound-
ary line. It also is interesting to note that nothing more 
was said or done about the location of the boundary 
until 1967 when this suit was filed. Mr. Dover never 
objected while he owned the property. 
Mr. Carter is a successor in title to one who has 
entered into an executed agreement as to the location 
7 
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of a boundary line and as such is bound by that agree-
ment. Schleining v. White, supra; Brown v. ll-Iilliner, 
supra. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DE-
NIED DAMAGES. 
Respondents, in their brief, have advanced no theory 
upon which Carter is entitled to recover any damages. 
The trial court in Finding of Fact No. 6 ( R. 30) 
found "that such fence was erected pursuant to a con-
versation with Robert Dover, who gave defendants 
permission to erect a fence there." This finding is sup-
ported by the evidence. Lindner testified as to the 
agreement between himself and Robert Dover under , 
which the fence was constructed. The location of the 
fence and boundary is further supported by the fact 
that no controversy arose during Robert Dover's life. 
If respondent, Carter, claims damages as a result 
of trespass, he has failed to establish it. A trespasser 
is one who make an unauthorized entry on another's 
property. 87 C.J.S. 956. Here, the entry was author-
ized. 
If damages are claimed for failure to pay rent, 
there has been no showing of an agreement or contract 
to pay rent and no showing of facts from which an obli-
gation may be implied. 
8 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the uncontroverted testimony as to the 
agreement, the performance of the agreement by con-
struction of the fence, the occupation of the area up to 
the fence, and the twelve-year period between the agree-
ment and this suit, the boundary line has been estab-
lished by an executed agreement. This case must be 
reversed with directions to enter a judgment in favor 
of the Lindners and the Woods quieting their title to 
the disputed land. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J. SKEEN 
R. C. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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